CHAPTER 9

The Making of International Migrants

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In this article, Saskia Sassen examines the ways that international migration flows are conditioned by the broader dynamics of globalization. She focuses, in particular, on three types of social conditions that influence and induce individuals to migrate: the structural conditions brought about by "economic internationalization"; the direct recruitment of immigrant workers by employers, governments, or immigrant networks; and the "organized export and trafficking" of men, women, and children.

. . . Cross-border migrations existed long before the current phase of globalization. Thus the task is to understand in what ways and under what conditions today's many migrations are or are not shaped by, grounded in, or merely inflected by globalization. The rich migration scholarship shows us, for instance, that transnational networks between sending and receiving countries were already part of many migration flows centuries ago. The content and modes of communications and transactions in the past may have differed sharply from today's, but the actual social fact was present in the past. Similarly, the scholarship finds that many features of past migrations, such as chain migration and family reunion, are present today . . . .

Building Bridges

We can identify three major patterns among the variety of economic conditions that contribute to migration links between sending and receiving countries: links brought about by economic globalization, links specifically developed to recruit workers, and the legal and illegal organized export of workers. In this section I discuss the first two; in the next section I discuss the third.

Economic Links

Links created by economic internationalization range from the offshoring of production and the establishment of export-oriented agriculture through foreign investment to the weight of multinationals in the consumer markets of labor-exporting countries. For instance, the development of commercial agriculture and export-oriented standardized manufacturing has dislocated traditional economies and eliminated survival opportunities for small producers, who have been forced to become wage laborers. This transition has in turn contributed to the mobilization of displaced smallholders and crafts-based producers in labor migrations, migrations that initially may be internal but eventually can become international. There are numerous examples of this dynamic launching new cross-border migrations. Mahler (1995) found that Salvadoran immigrants in the United States often had prior experience as migrant workers on coffee plantations. Fernandez-Kelly (1982) found that some of the internal migrants in the northern industrialization zone of Mexico eventually immigrated to the United States. Campos and Bonilla (1982) found that the U.S.-sponsored Bootstraps Operation in Puerto Rico had a similar effect in promoting immigration to the United States.

Another type of economic link results from the large-scale development of manufacturing operations in low-wage countries by firms from highly developed countries. The aim here has been, and continues to be, to lower the cost of the production of goods meant for, and reexported to, markets in the home country. This offshoring creates a number of objective and subjective links between the highly developed countries and the low-wage countries. Two migration-inducing conditions are at work here. One is that the better-situated workers may gain access to the contacts for migration, and the second is that the most disadvantaged workers are often "used up" after a few years and then need to find new ways of surviving and helping their families, which may in turn lead to out-migration. Disadvantaged workers are partially in an extended or deterritorialized *local* labor market that connects the two countries involved (see Sassen 1988, 1995, for a full development of these issues). The growing use of offshore production to lower costs also contributes to the creation of conditions in the highly developed countries that may lead to the demand for and recruitment of low-wage immigrant workers, given the growing pressure among firms and countries to lower costs to remain competitive. The internationalization of both manufacturing production and agriculture has contributed to the weakening of unions and has generally led to the search for low-wage workers inside the developed countries.

The case of Japan is of interest here because it allows us to capture the intersection of economic internationalization and immigration in its inception, and to do so in a country whose history, culture, and to a lesser extent, economic organization are radically different from those of other advanced economies. Japan's lack of an immigration history in the high-growth postwar decades—though it had one in the 1800s—provides us with a sharp view of how an immigration can start where there was none before. Furthermore, it started in the 1980s, the start of the current global age. Though its advent was much later than that of most other advanced economies, Japan now has a growing workforce of unauthorized immigrants in low-wage, unskilled jobs, which Japanese workers reject (Tsuzuki 2000; Mori 1997). Why did immigration not occur during the period of extremely rapid economic growth, during the 1950s and 1960s, when Japan experienced very sharp labor shortages? The answer lies partially in the fact that in the 1980s Japan became a major presence in a regional Asian economic system: it became the leading investor, foreign-aid donor, and exporter of consumer goods (including cultural products). In the 1980s, Japanese firms began to set up a large number of manufacturing operations outside Japan, with a heavy concentration in other Asian countries. This expansion has created legal and illegal networks linking those countries and Japan, and made them into exporters of immigrants to Japan (Morita and Sassen 1994). In its period of rapid growth, Japan lacked the links with potential immigrant-exporting countries that could have facilitated the formation of international migration flows. As Japan internationalized its economy and became a key investor in South and Southeast Asia, it created—wittingly or not—a transnational space for the circulation of its goods, capital, and culture, which in turn created conditions for the circulation of people. A key factor was recruitment by organized crime syndicates and by the government (Sassen 2001, chaps. 8 and 9). We may be seeing the early stages of an international labor market, a market that both labor contractors and unauthorized immigrants can "step into." This space now includes professionals as well (Farrer 2007). The Japanese government also initiated the recruitment of Japanese descendants in Brazil and Peru, adjusting its immigration law to do so. These emergent immigrant communities have now entered the stage of chain migration (Tsuda 1999; Tsuzuki 2000).

Another type of link is shaped by the growing Westernization of advanced education systems (Portes and Walton 1981), which facilitates the movement of highly educated workers into the developed Western countries. This is a process that has been happening for many decades and is usually referred to as the brain drain. Today it assumes specific forms, given the growing interdependence among countries and the formation of global markets and global firms. That is, we are seeing the formation of an increasingly complex and flexible transnational labor market for high-level professionals in advanced corporate services that links a growing number of highly developed and developing countries (Sassen 2001; 2006a, chap. 6; see also Skeldon 1997), including through virtual migration (Aneesh 2006). This development is also occurring in the high-tech sector, where the firms of the highly developed countries ate explicitly recruiting computer and software experts, especially from India. More generally we can capture these and other such dynamics in the strong trend for bimodal immigration in terms of education levels, with concentrations of low-wage, poorly educated workers and concentrations of highly educated workers.

Recruitment and Ethnic Networks

The second type of migration link includes a variety of mechanisms for the organized or informal recruitment of workers. This recruitment can operate through governments in the framework of a government-supported initiative by employers, it can operate directly through employers by illegally smuggling workers, or it can operate through kinship and family networks. Some of these mechanisms can also function as more generalized migration channels. Ethnic links established between communities of origin and communities of destination, typically via the formation of transnational households or broader kinship structures, emerge as crucial once a flow has been formed and serve to ensure its reproduction over time (Levitt 2001; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Basch, Schiller, and Blanc 1994; Wong 1996; Wallace and Stola 2001; White 1999; Farrer 2007). These recruitment and ethnic links tend to operate within the broader transnational spaces constituted by neocolonial processes and/or economic internationalization.

A key factor in the operation of ethnic and recruitment networks is the existence of an effective demand for immigrant workers in the receiving countries. The effective labor-market absorption of workers coming from different cultures with mostly lower levels of development arose as, and remains, an issue in the context of advanced service economies. Immigrants have a long history of getting hired to do low-wage jobs that require little education and are often situated in the least advanced sectors. Much analysis of postindustrial society and advanced economies generally posits a massive growth in the need for highly educated workers and little need for the types of jobs that a majority of immigrants have tended to hold. It suggests sharply reduced employment opportunities for workers with low levels of education in general and for immigrants in particular. Yet detailed empirical studies of major cities in highly developed countries show an ongoing demand for immigrant workers and a significant supply of old and new jobs requiring little education and paying low wages (Munger 2002; Harris 1995; Pattenas 2001, 2005). One current controversial issue is whether this job supply is merely or largely a residual partly inflated by the large supply of low-wage workers or mostly part of the reconfiguration of the job supply and employment relations that are in fact a feature of advanced service economies—that is, a systemic development that is an integral part of such economies There are no precise measures, and a focus on the jobs by themselves will hardly illuminate the issue. The jobs pay low wages, require little education, are undesirable, with no advancement opportunities and often few if any fringe benefits. There are clearly some aspects of the growth dynamics in advanced service economies that are creating at least part of this job supply (Sassen 2001, chaps. 8 and 9; Munger 2002; Roulleau-Berger 2003), which is a crucial cog in the sets of links used and developed by co-ethnics and recruiters.

One condition in the reproduction of these links is that over the last few decades and, in some cases, over the last century, some countries have become marked as labor exporters. In many ways the labor-exporting country is put in a subordinate position and is continually represented in the media and in political discourse as a labor-exporting country. This was also the case in the last century, when some labor-exporting areas existed in conditions of economic subordination and often quasi-political subordination as well. The former Polish territories partitioned off to Germany constituted such a region, and they generated a significant migration of "ethnic" Poles to western Germany and beyond. It is also the case of the Irish in England.

And it is the case of Italy, which reproduced itself as a supplier of labor to the rest of Europe for over a century.

It does seem—and the history of economic development supports this assertion—that once an area becomes a significant emigration region, it does not easily catch up in terms of development with those areas that emerge as labor-importers. Precisely because the importers have high, or at least relatively high, rates of growth, a cumulative causation effect sets in, which amounts to an accumulation of advantage. Whether immigration contributes to the process of cumulative causation is a complex issue, though much scholarship shows that immigration countries have gained multiple benefits from access to immigrant labor in particular periods of high economic growth (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Castles and Miller 2003). Furthermore, whether emigration contributes to the negative cumulative causation evident in exporting countries is also a complex matter. The evidence shows that individual households and localities may benefit but national economies do not. History suggests that the accumulation of advantage evident in receiving countries has tended to elude labor-exporting areas because they cannot catch up with, or are structurally excluded from, the actual spatialization of growth, precisely because it is characterized by uneven development. Italy and Ireland for two centuries were labor exporters, a fact that did not turn out to be a macroeconomic advantage. Their current economic dynamism and labor immigration have little to do with their history as emigration countries. Specific economic processes took hold, promoted by specific agents (Ireland's national state and Northern Italy's enterprises) and rapidly expanded each country's economy.

In brief, analytically we could argue that as today's labor-importing countries grew richer and more developed, they kept expanding their zones of recruitment or influence, covering a growing number of countries and including a variety of emigration-immigration dynamics, some rooted in past imperial conditions, others in the newer development asymmetries that underlie much migration today. There is a dynamic of inequality within which labor migrations are embedded that keeps on marking regions as labor exporting or labor importing, though a given country may switch categories, as is the case with Ireland and Italy today.

The Organized Export of Workers

The 1990s saw a sharp growth in the export of workers, both legal and illegal. This growth in exports is not simply the other side of the active recruitment of immigrants described above. It has its own specific features, consisting of operations for profit-making and for enhancing government revenue through the export of workers. In terms of economic conditioning, a crucial matter for research and explanation is what systemic links, if any, exist between the growth of the organized export of workers for private profit or government revenue enhancement, on the one hand, and major economic conditions in poor developing countries, on the other hand. Among these conditions are an increase in unemployment, the closure of a large number of typically small and medium-size enterprises oriented to national rather than export markets, and a large, often increasing government debt. While these economies are frequently grouped under the label of developing, they are in some cases struggling, stagnant, or even shrinking. (For the sake of brevity, we use *developing* here as shorthand for this variety of situations.) The evidence for these conditions is incomplete and partial, yet there is a growing consensus among experts that they are expanding and, furthermore, that women are often a majority of both the legal and illegal exported workers (IOM 2006; World Bank 2006).

The various types of exports of workers have strengthened at a time when major dynamics linked to economic globalization have had significant effects on developing economies. These economies have had to implement a bundle of new policies and accommodate new conditions associated with globalization: structural adjustment programs, the opening up of their economies to foreign firms, the elimination of multiple state subsidies, and, it would seem almost inevitably, financial crises and the prevailing types of programmatic solutions put forth by the IMF. It is now clear that in most of the countries involved, these conditions have created enormous costs for certain sectors of the economy and the population and have not fundamentally reduced government debt. For instance, the debt burden has affected state spending composition. We see this in Zambia, Ghana, and Uganda in the 1990s, when the World Bank saw their governments as cooperative and responsible and as effective in implementing Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). Zambia paid US$1.3 billion in debt but only US$37 million for primary education; Ghana paid $375 million in debt service but only $75 million in social expenses; and Uganda paid nine dollars per capita on its debt and only one dollar for health care (Ismi, 1998).

Are there systemic links between these two sets of developments: the growth of organized exports of workers from certain developing economies and the rise in unemployment and debt in their economies? One way of articulating this issue in substantive terms is to posit the growing importance in all these countries of alternative ways of making a living, making a profit, and securing government revenue due to the shrinking opportunities for employment; the shrinking opportunities for more traditional forms of profit making as foreign firms enter an expanding range of economic sectors in these countries; growing pressures to develop export industries; and the decrease in government revenues, partly linked to these conditions and to the burden of debt servicing. Prostitution and labor migration are ways of making a living; the legal and illegal trafficking in workers, including workers for the sex industry, is growing in importance as a way of making a profit; and the remittances sent home by emigrants, as well as the revenues from the organized export of workers, arc increasingly important sources of foreign currency for some governments. Women are by far the majority group in the illegal trafficking for the sex industry and in governments' organized export of workers (see Sassen 2000 for sources on these variables).

The organized export of workers, whether legal or illegal, is facilitated in part by the organizational and technical infrastructure of the global economy: the formation of global markets, the intensification of transnational and translocal networks, the development of communications technologies that easily escape conventional surveillance practices. The strengthening of global networks and, in some of these cases, the formation of new global networks are embedded or made possible by the existence of a global economic system and its associated development of various institutional supports for cross-border money flows and markets. Once there is an institutional infrastructure for globalization, processes that have basically operated at the national level can scale up to the global level even when doing so is not necessary for their operation. Operating globally in such cases contrasts with processes that are by their very features global, such as the network of financial centers underlying the formation of a global capital market.

Debt and debt-servicing problems have become a systemic feature of the developing world since the 1980s and are contributing to the expanded efforts to export workers both legally and illegally. A considerable body of research shows the detrimental effects of such debt on government programs for women and children, notably, programs for education and health care, which are clearly investments necessary to ensure a better future. Furthermore, the increased unemployment typically associated with the austerity and adjustment programs implemented by international agencies to address government debt has been found to have adverse effects on broad sectors of the population. Subsistence food production, informal work, emigration, prostitution—all have grown as survival options. Heavy government debt and high unemployment have brought with them the need to search for alternative sources of government revenue, and the shrinking of regular economic opportunities has brought with it a widened use of illegal profit making by enterprises and organizations. Generally, most countries that became deeply indebted in the 1980s have not been able to solve the problem. And in the 1990s we saw a new set of countries become deeply indebted. Over those two decades many innovations were launched, most importantly by the IMF and the World Bank through their structural adjustment programs and structural adjustment loans, respectively. The latter were tied to economic policy reform rather than the funding of a particular project. The purpose of such programs is to make states more "competitive," which typically means making sharp cuts in various social programs. (For evidence on these various trends, see Ward 1990; Beneria and Feldman 1992; Bradshaw et al. 1993; Cagatay and Ozler 1995; Pyle and Ward 2003; Buechler 2007.)

In the 1990s, thirty-three of the forty-one "heavily indebted poor countries" (HIPCs) paid $3 in debt-service payments to the highly developed countries for every $1 received in development assistance. Debt-service ratios to gross national product (GNP) in many of the HIPCs exceed sustainable limits (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 1999). Those ratios are far more extreme than what were considered unmanageable levels in the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s. Debt (including interest)-to-GNP ratios are especially high in Africa, where they stand at 123 percent, compared with 42 percent in Latin America and 28 percent in Asia. The IMF now asks HIPCs to pay 20 to 25 percent of their export earnings toward debt service. In contrast, in 1953 the Allies cancelled 80 percent of Germany's war debt and insisted on a debt service of only 3 to 5 percent of export earnings. The ratio was 8 percent for Central Europe after Communism. This debt burden inevitably has large repercussions for state-spending composition and thus for the population. By 2003 debt service as a share of exports ranged from extremely high levels for Zambia (29.6 percent) and Mauritania (27.7 percent), to significantly lowered levels compared with the 1990s for Uganda (down from 19.8 percent in 1995 to 7.1 percent in 2003) and Mozambique (down from 34.5 percent in 1995 to 6.9 percent in 2003) (World Bank 2005; UNDP 2005). And in 2006 the governments of the leading developed countries cancelled the debt of the eighteen poorest countries, recognizing they would never be able to pay their debts.

A body of research literature on the devastating impact of government debt focused on the implementation of a first generation of structural adjustment programs in several developing countries in the 1980s and on a second generation of such programs, one more directly linked to the implementation of the global economy, in the 1990s. This literature has documented the disproportionate burden that these programs have placed on the lower middle classes, the working poor, and most especially, women (for example, Ward 1990; Bose and Acosta-Belen 1995; Buechler 2007; Tinker 1990; Oxfam 1999; UNDP 2005). These conditions push households and individuals to accept or seek legal or illegal traffickers to take them to any job anywhere.

Yet even under these extreme conditions, in which traffickers often function as recruiters who may initiate the procedure, only a minority of people are emigrating. The participation of traffickers to some extent alters the type of patterning associated with the government and corporate recruitment discussed above, which tends to be embedded in older sets of links connecting the countries involved.

Remittances sent by immigrants represent a major source of foreign exchange reserves for the governments of many developing countries. While the flow of remittances may be minor compared with the massive daily capital flows in various financial markets, it is often very significant for developing or struggling economies. From 1998 to 2005, global remittances sent by immigrants to their home country rose from $70 billion to $230 billion (World Bank 2006). To understand the significance of that figure, it should be related to the GDP and foreign currency reserves in the specific countries involved. For instance, in the Philippines, a key exporter of migrants generally and of women for work in the entertainment industry of several countries, remittances have represented the third largest source of foreign exchange over the last several years. In Bangladesh, a country with a significant number of workers in the Middle East, Japan, and several European countries, remittances represent about one third of foreign exchange.

The illegal exportation of migrants is above all a profitable business for the traffickers, though it can also add to the flow of legal remittances. According to a United Nations report, criminal organizations in the 1990s generated an estimated \$3.5 billion per year in profits from trafficking male and female migrants for work. By 2006, trafficking for the sex trades was estimated at US\$19 billion by Interpol and US\$27 billion by the International Labor Office (Leidholdt 2005:5). Once this trafficking was mostly the trade of petty criminals. Today it is an increasingly organized operation that functions at the global scale. The involvement of organized crime is a recent development in the case of migrant trafficking. There are also reports that organized crime groups are creating intercontinental strategic alliances through networks of co-ethnics throughout several countries; such alliances facilitate transportation, local contacts and distribution, and the provision of false documents.

Men and women are trafficked for work, with women at a greater risk of being diverted to work in the sex trades. Some women know that they are being trafficked for prostitution, but for many the conditions of their recruitment and the extent of abuse and bondage become evident only after they arrive in the receiving country. The conditions of confinement are often extreme, akin to slavery, and so are the conditions of abuse, including rape and other forms of sexual violence, as well as physical punishment. Sex workers are severely underpaid, and their wages are often withheld.

The next two sections focus on two aspects of the organized exportation of workers: government exports and the illegal trafficking in women for the sex industry.

Government-Organized Exports

The exportation of workers is a means by which governments cope with unemployment and foreign debt. There are two ways in which governments have secured benefits through this strategy. One is highly formalized, and the other is simply a by-product of the migration process itself. Among the strongest examples of the formalized mode are South Korea and the Philippines (Sassen 1988; Parreñas 2001) and now China. In the 1970s, South Korea promoted the export of workers as an integral part of its growing overseas construction industry, initially to the Middle Eastern members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and then worldwide. This is the model pursued by China in its current African investments. When South Korea experienced its own economic boom, exports of workers fell and imports began (Seol and Skrentny 2003). In contrast, the Philippine government has expanded and diversified the export of its citizens to deal with unemployment and secure revenue.

The Filipino case illuminates a series of issues concerning a government's exportation of workers (Yamamoto 2006). The government has played an important role in the emigration of Filipino women to the United States, the Middle East, and Japan through the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Established in 1982, POEA organized and oversaw the export of nurses and maids to high-demand areas around the world. High foreign debt and high unemployment combined to make this policy attractive (Sassen 1988). Overseas Filipino workers have sent home almost \$1 billion a year on average in the last few years. Labor-importing countries have welcomed this policy for their own reasons. Middle Eastern OPEC members saw the demand for domestic workers grow sharply after the 1973 oil boom. The United States, confronted with an acute shortage of nurses, a profession that demands years of training yet garners rather low wages and little recognition, passed the Immigration Nursing Relief Act in 1989, opposed by the American Nursing Association. About 80 percent of the nurses brought in under that act were from the Philippines. And in the 1980s, when its economy was booming, expendable income was rising, and labor shortages were intensifying, Japan passed legislation that permitted the entry of "entertainment workers," mostly from the Philippines. The government of the Philippines also passed regulations that permitted mail-order-bride agencies to recruit young Filipinas to marry foreign men as a matter of contractual agreement; this was an organized effort by the government. Among the major clients were the United States and Japan. Japan's agricultural communities were a key destination for Filipina brides, given the enormous shortages of people, and especially young women, in the Japanese countryside when the economy was booming and the demand for labor in the large metropolitan areas was extremely high. Municipal governments made it a policy to accept Filipina brides. The largest number of Filipinas going through these government-promoted channels work overseas as maids, particularly in other Asian countries (Parreñas 2001, 2005; Chin 1997; Heyzer 1994). The second largest group, and the fastest growing, comprises entertainers, most of whom work in Japan (Sassen 2001, chap. 9; Yamamoto 2006).

The rapid increase in the number of Filipina migrants working as entertainers is largely due to the "entertainment brokers" in the Philippines, more than five hundred of them, who operate outside the state—even though the government may still benefit from the remittances sent home by these overseas workers. The brokers provide women for the sex industry in Japan, which is basically supported or controlled by organized gangs, rather than going through the government-controlled program for the entry of entertainers. The women are recruited for singing and entertaining, but frequently, perhaps mostly, they are forced into prostitution as well. They are recruited and brought into Japan through both formal legal channels and illegal ones. Either way they have little power to resist once they are in the system. And even though they are paid below minimum wage, they produce significant profits for the brokers and employers. There has recently been an enormous increase in the number of so-called entertainment businesses in Japan (Sassen 2001, chap. 9; Yamamoto 2006).

The government of the Philippines approved most mail-order-bride organizations until 1989. But under the government of Corazon Aquino, the stories of abuse by foreign husbands led to the banning of the business. Nevertheless, it is almost impossible to eliminate these organizations, and they continue to operate in violation of the law.

The Philippines is not the only country to have explored official strategies for the exportation of its workers, although it is perhaps the one with the most developed program. After its 1997–1998 financial crisis, Thailand started a campaign to promote emigration for work and recruitment of Thai workers by overseas firms. The government sought to export workers to the Middle East, the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Australia, and Greece. Sri Lanka's government has tried to export 200,000 workers in addition to the 1 million it already has overseas; Sri Lankan women remitted $880 million in 1998, mostly from their earnings as maids in the Middle East and Far East (Anonymous 1999). By the 1970s, Bangladesh had already organized extensive labor-exporting programs to OPEC members of the Middle East. These programs have continued and—along with individual migration to OPEC nations as well as various other countries, notably the United States and the United Kingdom—are a significant source of foreign exchange. Bangladesh's overseas workers remitted $1.4 billion a year in the late 1990s (David 1999).

Trafficking in Women

International trafficking in women for the sex industry has grown sharply over the last decade (Lin and Wijers 1997; Shannon 1999; Kyle and Koslowski 2001). The available evidence suggests that it is highly profitable for those running the trade. The United Nations estimates that 4 million people were trafficked in 1998, producing a profit of $7 billion to criminal groups. Those funds include remittances from prostitutes' earnings and payments to organizers and facilitators.

It is estimated that in recent years several million women and girls have been trafficked within and outside Asia and the former Soviet Union, two major trafficking areas. Growth in those areas can be linked to women being pushed into poverty or sold to brokers due to the poverty of their households. High unemployment in the former Soviet republics has been a factor promoting growth of criminal gangs as well as the increase in trafficking in women. For instance, Ukrainian and Russian women, highly prized in the sex market, earn criminal gangs between $500 and $1,000 per woman delivered. The women can be expected to service on average fifteen clients a day and can be expected to make about $215,000 per month for a gang (International Organization for Migration 1996).

Such networks also facilitate the organized circulation of trafficked women among third-party countries. Thus traffickers may move women from Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, and China to Thailand, whereas Thai women may have been moved to Japan and the United States. There are various reports on the particular cross-border movements in trafficking. Malay brokers sell Malay women into prostitution in Australia. Gangs have sold women from Albania and Kosovo into prostitution in London (Hamzic and Sheehan 1999). European teens from Paris and other cities have been sold to Arab and African customers (Shannon 1999). In the United States the police broke up an international Asian ring that imported women from China, Thailand, Korea, Malaysia, and Vietnam (Booth 1999). The trafficked women were charged between $30,000 and $40,000 in contracts to be paid through their work in the sex or garment trade.

As tourism has grown sharply over the last decade and has become a major development strategy for cities, regions, and whole countries, the entertainment sector has experienced a parallel growth and is seen now as a key aspect of this development strategy. In many places the sex trade is part of the entertainment industry and has similarly grown. At some point it becomes clear that the sex trade itself can become a development strategy in areas with high unemployment, poverty, and a government desperate for revenue and foreign exchange reserves. When local manufacturing and agriculture can no longer function as sources of employment, profits, and government revenue, what was once a marginal source of earnings, profits, and revenue now becomes far more important. The increased importance of tourism in development generates multiplying tie-ins. For instance, when the IMF and the World Bank see tourism as a solution to some of the obstacles to growth in many poor countries and provide loans for its development, they may well be contributing also to the development of a broader institutional setting for the growth of the entertainment industry and, indirectly, the sex trade. This tie-in with development strategies is a signal that trafficking in women may well see a sharp expansion.

The entry of organized crime into the sex trades, the formation of cross-border ethnic networks, and the growing transnationalization in so many aspects of tourism suggest that we are likely to see further development of a global sex industry. This development could mean greater attempts to enter into more and more "markets" and a general expansion of the industry. Given the growing number of women with few if any employment options, the prospects are grim. Women in the sex industry become—in certain kinds of economies—a crucial link supporting the expansion of the entertainment industry, and through that they become a link to tourism as a development strategy, which in turn becomes a source of government revenue. These tie-ins are structural, not a function of conspiracies. Their weight in an economy will be increased by the absence or limitations of other sources for securing a livelihood, profits, and revenues for, respectively, workers, enterprises, and governments.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have sought to specify the ways in which international migration flows are conditioned by broader politico-economic dynamics, even though they cannot be fully explained without introducing more sociological variables. One of the major implications of this type of analysis is that we need to detect the shaping of a migration option and situate the decisions by individual migrants within these broader dynamics.

Three types of social conditions facilitate the decision to migrate and induce individuals to make that decision. A first set of broad structural conditions has to do with the types of links brought about by economic internationalization in its many instantiations: old colonial and more recent neocolonial forms and particular types of links brought about by current forms of economic globalization. A second set of conditions involves the direct recruitment of immigrant workers by employers, by governments on behalf of employers, or through the immigrant network. A third and final set of conditions involves the organized export and trafficking, increasingly illegal, of men, women, and children. These activities create whole new ways of linking labor-export and labor-importing countries, beyond the old colonial or the new global economic connections. . . .